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Introduction
An income gap is usually defined as the inequality gap in incomes between rich and poor. One may call such 
a gap the relative income gap or rig. From time to time in an economy a different type of income gap can  
occur:  the  absolute  income  gap or  aig.  This  income  gap can  be  defined  as  the  income  shortfall  to  all  
individual households together to purchase all goods and services available in an economy. This paper will  
focus on the absolute income gap only, either referred to as income gap or aig.
A well known counterpart to the income gap is the output gap reflecting the un-used capacity to produce 
goods and services in an economy.  The latter reflects the producers’ unfulfilled expectations of demand  
levels; it reflects the supply side in an economy.
This paper aims to set out why individual households can collectively experience an income gap independent  
of whether producers have set up an output capacity which may under- or overestimate demand levels.
The U.S and the U.K. produce statistics on the balance sheet of households and non-profit organisations. The 
assets side is divided into nonfinancial assets (mainly homes and consumer durable goods) and financial  
assets. The financial liabilities side includes all liabilities entered into by individual households. Usually the 
collective liabilities -government debt levels- are excluded. The result is the net worth position -the equity 
base- of all individual households together. These statistics measure the changes in assets and liabilities; they 
produce the evidence when part of an income gap -the equity gap- occurs, but not the reasons for such 
income gap occurring.
In 2008 U.S. individual households saw their net worth -equity level- reduced by about 110% of U.S. GDP 
value of the same year. In the U.K. individual households lost about 90% of the value of the U.K. GDP in the 
same year. 
The magnitude of these losses were enormous and had and still have major consequences on what individual 
households could and still can afford to spend in the years following 2008 and how their attitudes to savings  
and spending did change. These losses had serious effects on government deficits in the years after 2008 and 
on the banking system. Unemployment levels increased rapidly due to the lack of purchasing power; labour 
participation rates dropped, wages grew less rapidly than inflation levels and asset prices tumbled, especially 
home values and equity prices.
All existing economic policies have shown few signs of making a substantial  impact  on unemployment  
levels and on economic growth rates. Even unusual policies, such as quantitative easing, did not bring back 
economic growth rates and higher levels of employment and incomes.
The main reason is that existing economic policies start from the premise of what governments and central  
banks can do, rather than what individual households need in order to get back to work and earning their own 
incomes. The focus of economic theories need to be switched from focussing on governments’ and central  
banks’  actions  to  actions  which  help  overcome  the  absolute  income  gap  for  all  individual  households  
together.
What is of particular importance to individual households is to study the links between their incomes and 
inflation levels in both consumer prices and in asset values.  The borrowing levels of both the individual 
households and the government together need to be studied as individual households are responsible for  
paying back both types of debt.  The developments in nominal equity levels of individual households need to  
be a subject of study as they can be influenced by true savings, but also by excessive price rises in homes or  
shares for instance. Finally an impediment in moving equity wealth into cash for consumption is also the 
subject of this study. This is especially applicable to pension funds’ wealth owned by individual households.
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1 The income gap approach
The study of economic events under an income gap approach does not start with whether a government runs  
a budget deficit, or whether banks make huge losses and need to be rescued or even whether some companies 
need bailing out because they are too important to an economy to let them fail; no, it does start with the 
collective group of individual households in an economy and studies what happens to them. An income gap 
occurs for a number of reasons:
• Individuals cannot find jobs: a major source of income loss,
• Average wages do not keep pace with inflation levels; another income loss,
• Available disposable incomes are reduced due to increased taxes, mortgage charges, reduced interest  
rates over savings, increased import costs and repayments of outstanding debt,
• Asset prices for homes, shares and other investments can change due to a number of factors, which  
influence the ability or preference of individual households to borrow. Such asset  price changes 
influence the equity levels -the net worth- of individual households
• The liabilities side is influenced by the changes in the level of borrowings by individual households  
and governments; increased borrowing levels increase consumption levels (quantities) or inflation 
(price changes); reduced borrowing levels mainly reduce consumption levels.
As the evidence shows in the Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations for the U.S 1 and 
The  Households  &  Non-Profit  Serving  Households:  Total  Net  Worth  by  asset  and  year  for  the  U.K. 2 
individual households lost respectively $12.6 trillion in the U.S. or 19.1% of their net worth in 2008 and 
£841.2 billion in the U.K. or 12.4% of their net worth in the same year. The loss in the U.S. should be seen  
against the context of an average annual profit of $3.3 trillion over the period 2000-2007. The total change 
was therefore $15.9 trillion in 2008. This “loss” was 111.2% of U.S. nominal GDP in 2008.
For the U.K. the average profit made by the individual households was £452.6 billion per annum over the  
years 2002-2007. Add this average profit over previous years to the loss of £841.2 billion in 2008 and the 
real “loss” was £ 1.29 trillion. This represented a 90.3% loss in nominal GDP terms in 2008.
Just these two figures: a loss of more than the whole GDP value of 2008 in a single year in the U.S and  
practically the whole GDP value in the U.K. in the same year should have alerted economists that something 
was fundamentally wrong for the individual households. The latter households did not volunteer to lose such 
substantial amounts; collectively they did not change their behaviour of turning themselves from prudent 
households to super gamblers. 
The U.S. and the U.K. are just two country examples of the major changes which happened to individual  
households in the world since 2008. Other countries, like Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus  
do not have the same type of statistics, but all circumstantial evidence like house price developments, stock 
markets’ indices as well as the number of unemployed indicate that the same economic processes took place  
in the latter countries.
In my opinion the most amazing fact has been that since 2008 the economic policy priorities seem solely 
focussed on rescuing governments and banks and that the unemployed, the income growth below inflation 
levels for those in work and the net equity position of individual households has been totally forgotten. Not  
only have individual households’ financial position been forgotten, the actions in some countries by central 
banks and governments have further undermined the restoration of the financial muscle of the individual 
households.  Collective  entities  like  governments  and  banks  have  claimed  priority  over  individual 
households.  Lord Keynes  understood the importance of individual  households in the demand process in 
countries. Perhaps his emphasis on additional government spending has become somewhat outdated in view 
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
2 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cap-stock/the-national-balance-sheet/2012-results/stb---national-balance-sheet-
2012.html
4
                                                                         An Income Gap Theory and its Effects on Unemployment and Economic Growth© Drs Kees De Koning
of the extremely high levels of government debt already existing in most developed countries, but his priority 
was individual households’ income and demand management.
The 2008 crisis was a crisis caused by the financial sector, especially in respect to home mortgages in the  
U.S.,  but certainly not  restricted to the U.S alone. Other countries like the U.K. and Spain for instance 
followed a similar pattern. Home loans were granted to individual households who could not repay such 
loans or homes were build, like in the case of Spain, for which there were no buyers. A substantial share of 
these loans was securitized, especially in the U.S.; which, in laymen terms, means callable at any time as 
long as there are potential buyers for such bonds. The losses on outstanding home loans caused the demand 
for such bonds to dry up completely. Investors wanted to get out of such loans instantly, rather than wait for 
households’ income developments to improve. To try to get money back out of fixed assets in a very short  
period  of  time,  did,  of  course,  affect  home  prices.  The  2008 crisis  can  best  be  described  as  a  money 
conversion scheme into fixed assets - homes- gone wrong. Money was given to individual households who 
could not afford to pay back such loans and investors wanted as much of their money back as they could get  
and as soon as possible by selling off the underlying assets. The 2008 crisis was a financial liabilities crisis,  
which caused the subsequent  financial  assets crisis  through the losses on liabilities,  which subsequently 
caused non-financial assets (homes) to drop substantially in values. The combination of the non-payment on 
financial liabilities, the drop in financial assets values and the drop in home values caused the subsequent 
economic crisis in the real economy. Home owners who had fully paid off their mortgages were just as much 
affected by dropping house prices as those who saw their home equity position turn into negative equity. The  
2008 experience showed that money flows rather than real sector activities seriously damaged the financial  
health of all individual households. It subsequently wrecked the income levels for many of those who wanted  
to  work.  Mistakes  by the  money managers  caused  the longest  downturn  in  economic  growth since  the 
1930’s. For many European countries the hardship is not over yet.
This paper hopes to establish that  when financial  assets and liabilities’  flows create havoc to economic  
growth and employment levels -as it has since 2008-, it will also be financial flows which can help to turn  
economies around.
In the next sections an attempt will be made to show that helping individual households in their efforts to  
provide for themselves has the best chance of turning economies around. Employment, unemployment and 
the  labour  force  participation  rates  will  be  discussed  in  section  2.  In  section  3  the  incomes  earned as 
compared to inflation levels will  be discussed and in section 4 the net equity position of the individual 
households will be highlighted. In section 5 some institutional and other adjustments will be worked out 
which could be used to close the income gap .Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Employment, unemployment and the labour force participation rates
In the U.K. in 2006 29.025 million people had a job and the labour force participation rate was 72.8% of all  
individuals in the age group 16-64 years. In 2006 1.674 million people were unemployed, which was 5.4% of 
the labour force.
When the labour force participation rate drops, it means that less income is generated by the active labour  
force. For instance take the case of 2009 as an example. In 2009 the actual employment level was 28.960  
million people and the labour force participation rate 70.9%. If  the rate of 72.8% had been maintained, 
776,000 more people would have had a job. At an average income of £23,410 per person, this loss in income 
amounted to £17.95 billion which was equal to 1.28% of nominal GDP in 2009. Add to this that -compared 
to 2006- 720,000 more people were registered as unemployed. This meant that unemployment benefits had 
to be paid for the unemployed, increasing government expenditure by 43% for the unemployed category. The 
additional unemployment benefits added up to £2.4 billion in 2009 or combined with the change in labour 
force participation rates a total income loss of £20.35 billion which equalled 1.46% of nominal GDP in the 
U.K. in 2009.
5
                                                                         An Income Gap Theory and its Effects on Unemployment and Economic Growth© Drs Kees De Koning
The income loss by those who could have worked, but could not get employment, as well as the costs of  
unemployment benefits, leads to a double loss for individual households still in work. The collective labour 
force earns less -for 2009 it was £17.95 billion less to be precise- and it has to pay more in taxes to support  
those out of work -again £2.4 billion more in 2009-. One should be reminded that there is no value judgment  
in this statement; the discussion is not about whether unemployment benefits should be paid and for which  
amount;  this  is  a political  choice.  The income loss  reflects the actual  impact  on individual  households’ 
incomes for those still in work -the economic impact-.
An element which is often overlooked is that such income loss cannot be recuperated in future years. It is a  
time related loss: the U.K. labour force did not work and has not worked at full capacity since 2009. The 
labour factor is different from the production capacity of machinery. Machinery can usually be used in future  
years until a technical collapse occurs. Since 2009 in the U.K., the labour force participation ratio has not  
reached 72.8% again and the unemployment rate has not dropped till 5.4%. In the U.K. losses on incomes 
have been accumulating year over year, reducing the prospects for economic growth, the financial health of  
banks and companies and the health of the U.K. government’s finances.
One  does  not  have  to  make  a  precise  calculation  for  countries  like  Spain,  Greece  and Portugal  where 
unemployment rates have soared, to understand how the very substantial income losses work their way into  
their respective economies.
Just one more country example: the United States. In December 2006 the size of the U.S. labour force stood 
at 152.732 million people of which 145.970 million were employed and 6.762 million were unemployed or  
4.4% of the labour force. These figures were seasonally adjusted. In December 2009 the labour force stood at  
153.120 million with 138.025 million employed persons and 15.095 million unemployed or 9.9% of the 
labour force. The labour force participation ratio was 66.4% in December 2006 and 64.6% in December  
2009. While some demographic factors can play a role in the reduction of the labour force participation rate 
-retirement from work for instance- the reduced rate can also occur due to people being so disappointed in  
finding jobs that they no longer bother. The latter group are in the right age group 16-64 years, but are no  
longer actively seeking jobs. In the period December1997-December 2006 the U.S labour force participation  
rate dropped from 67.2% till 66.4%. However since 2007 the drop has been much more severe from 66.4% 
till 63.5% in February this year (2013). This is unlikely to all originate from demographic factors, especially 
in the U.S. where it is quite common to work past retirement age. The income losses due to the reduced 
labour force participation rates are substantial. For instance, if in 2009 the labour force participation rate had 
been sustained at 66.4%, some 1.8% or 2.756 million people could have earned additional incomes. The 
amount  would have been $45,155 -the average employee  income in the private sector-  times  the 2.756  
million, which equals $124.5 billion in lost income. The rise in unemployment figures from 6.762 million in 
2006 to 15.095 million in 2009 -an increase of 8.333 million led to additional unemployment benefits of  
some $126.5 billion in income losses to the working population. From these two factors alone, the U.S.  
economy suffered an income loss of 1.8% of nominal GDP in 2009.
Again, like in the U.K. and other countries, in the U.S. the income losses accumulate. However in the U.S.  
the unemployment rate has come down to 7.7% in February this year (2013). In the U.K. the latest data 
indicate a stagnating unemployment rate at 7.8%., while in the Eurozone countries the unemployment rates 
are still rising.
3 The income gap and inflation levels
Inflation -price rises- have a negative effect on the value of the monies earned through employment as well  
as on the value of savings. 
In the next table an overview is given for the U.K. for the period 2000-2012 for the retail price index, the  
average annual nominal earnings and the average annual real earnings.3 
3 http://www.measuringworth.com/ukearncpi/
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Table 1: Retail Price Index, Average Annual Nominal Earnings, Average Annual Real Earnings U.K. 
2000-2012
Year RPI  (2010=100) Av.  Annual  Nominal 
Earnings (£s)
Av. Annual Real Earnings
(in 2010 £s)
2000  76.176 16,545 21,719
2001  77.526 17,403 22,448
2002  78.818 17,953 22,778
2003  81.098 18,525 22,843
2004  83.513 19,331 23,147
2005  85.871 20,215 23,541
2006  88.615 21,164 23,883
2007  92.414 22,217 24,041
2008  93.256 23,019 24,683
2009  95.589 22,975 24,036
2010 100.000 23,504 23,504
2011 104.860 24,087 22,970
2012 108.100 24,472 22,639
In the period 2003 till 2008 the average annual earnings went up by 3.7% and inflation by on average 1.6% 
per annum, which left the average earner with an in increase in real earnings before tax. However since 2009 
inflation rates increased and the increase in nominal  earnings slowed down.  In real terms this meant  a  
decline in income levels to the extent that the 2012 average earnings in the U.K. after inflation were no  
higher than in 2002.
The disposable income levels are also influenced by government tax takes. In fiscal year 2002-2003 the U.K.  
Government’s expenditure levels were at 38.5% of GDP and in fiscal year 2011-2012 such expenditure had 
gone up to 45.4% of GDP. The fact that the U.K. Government had to borrow a substantial part of such  
expenditure does not take away the responsibility of individual households to pay back such expenditure.
The conclusion for the U.K. is that since 2009 the real incomes of individual households have been dropping 
and the tax obligations have gone up, a scissor movement which leaves individual households in a much 
weaker position to expand consumption levels.
For the U.S. the following table shows how the production workers hourly compensation in nominal dollars  
compares with the U.S. inflation levels over the period 2002-2012.
Table 2 Production Workers Hourly Compensation and U.S. CPI levels 2002-2012
Year Production Workers
Hourly Compensation
(nominal  dollars 
annual increase %)
Consumer Price
Inflation %
Households Gain (+)
Households Loss (-)
2002 8.57 1.58 +++
2003 2.47 2.28     +
2004 7.10 2.66 +++
2005 3.68 3.39     +
2006 1.88 3.23    - -
2007 2.88 2.85    +/-
2008 3.19 3.84      -
2009 1.08 - 0.36    ++
2010 1.11 1.64      -
2011 1.67 3.16  - - -
2012 1.00 2.07    - -
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This table only gives a partial picture of what happened in the U.S. Firstly it deals with those in work and not 
with  those  who  could  not  find  jobs  any longer.  The  income  shock  for  those  who  lost  their  jobs  was 
significantly more extensive than for those still in jobs or those in self employment.  Secondly from 2009 the  
U.S. Government budget deficit increased from $458 billion in 2008 to $1.413 trillion in 2009. In 2010 it 
was reduced somewhat to $1.293 trillion and stayed practically at this level in 2011 and 2012. This all means  
that U.S. individual households not only saw their real income levels drop over the last three years, but also  
simultaneously saw their debt obligations increase sharply as a consequence of the budget deficits run up by 
the U.S. Government.. Again the scissor movement occurred as was the case in the U.K.: higher debt levels 
combined with real income drops.
Disposable income levels are not only determined by income out of work, but also by incomes out of savings 
and by changes in the levels of borrowings.
In a previous paper: The United Kingdom: Economic Growth, a Draft Master Plan4, I compared the interest 
rates received on  short term cash -the base rate- and on long term cash -the 10 year Gilts yield- with the  
inflation rate over the period 2002-2012.  From 2002 till and including 2008, there was a positive margin for  
both short term and long term cash savings over the inflation level. From 2010 till current date, inflation 
levels have substantially exceeded both the short term base rate (0.5% at the moment) and the long term 
government bond yield (1.98% over 2012). The inflation rate was respectively 4.6% in 2010, 5.2% in 2011 
and 3.1% in 2012.
The collective individual households’ incomes in the U.K. were not only hit by higher unemployment levels,  
lower labour force participation rates and higher government debt levels,  they also suffered from below 
inflation level rewards over their savings. The income gap did become wider and wider over the period 2009 
till to-day.
For the U.S. the income gap created out of savings was smaller than in the U.K., but still relevant over the  
last few years.
What has been striking both for the U.K. and the U.S. is how individual households have reacted to the  
economic and housing crisis.  In the U.S. the outstanding level of home mortgages reached its peak in 2007 
at $10.549 trillion. According to the most recent data as per end 2012 it now stands at $9.431 trillion, which 
is $1.1 trillion less than per end 2007. On top of this one should take into account that over the period 2008  
to to-date about 3 million new homes were built in the U.S at an average value of $165,000 per home. The  
money used for acquiring these homes - $495 billion- did not come from individual household’s borrowings 
but out of their incomes and savings. Less borrowings plus the money spend on additional homes amounts to 
some  $1.6  trillion,  which  reduces  incomes  available  for  other  consumption  spending.  As  a  result  U.S.  
homeowners are working their way back to the pre-crisis owners’ equity percentage of 56.6% in stead of the  
current 46.6%.
In the U.K. according to the most recent data per end of 2011 the total nominal mortgage level stayed the 
same over the whole period as from 2008, notwithstanding relatively high inflation levels. Over the years  
2008-2011 480,000 new homes were built in the U.K. with an average value of £180,000 per home. This 
amounts to £86.3 billion in savings out of current incomes over these years (2008-2011), another income loss 
-reduction in monies available to spend on other consumer goods and services- out of current incomes.
4 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44369/
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4 Net equity levels for individual households
There are a series of factors which influence the net equity levels of individual households. Basically these 
factors can be split up into three categories:
• Income related factors.
• Assets related factors  and
• Liabilities related factors.
The income related factors are jobs related as was explained in section 2; they are inflation related as was 
explained  in  section  3;  they are  also  related  to  the  level  of  taxes  imposed  on  individuals,  but  also  on 
companies. Government regulations can impose charges on individual households in an indirect manner; for 
instance green energy charges and increased train fares above inflation levels. The latter charges do not count 
as direct taxation levels,  but they do affect individual households’ incomes. The same services will  cost  
more.
Another income related factor is related to import  prices. If oil  or gas or other imported commodity or  
consumer good prices rise above inflation levels, this means a reduction in disposable incomes for domestic 
consumption.
The next group of factors which influence both incomes and asset values for individual households is home 
mortgages. Interest rates can change; the type of mortgages available can change, for instance the shift from 
interest only mortgages to repayment mortgages; the banks or financial markets’ losses on mortgages can  
change which have a direct effect on individual households’ net equity levels. On the other hand home prices 
can change both upwards as well as downwards; this is an asset related factor.
The liabilities include all debt levels which have to be serviced by individual households. Such debt levels  
include all government debt. An increase in debt levels can make money available above income levels and  
can help consumption levels to continue above income levels. If borrowings grow too fast, it can also induce 
asset price inflation. Debts need to be serviced otherwise an economy -which means individual households-  
lose  out  in  reduced  equity  levels.  Write  offs  -both  of  individual  and  corporate  as  well  as  sometimes  
government debt- of uncollectable debts show up instantly in the equity net worth position of all individual  
households.
In Table 3 an overview is given of the increase (+)/decrease(-) (factor P) in individual households’ financial  
liabilities as derived from the collective households statistics mentioned previously and the increase/decrease  
in the U.S. and U.K. government debt levels (factor G) over the period 1996-2012 for the U.S and to 2011 
for the U.K. These “credit extensions or reductions on outstanding loans” are added up into one figure per 
annum and expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP per annum.
9
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Table 3 U.K and U.S. Individual households’ and Government’ borrowing levels as compared to GDP
Year U.K P
(£ billion)
U.K G
(£billion)
P+G
(£ billion)
% GDP U.S P
($ billion)
U.S G
($ billion)
P+G
($ billion)
% GDP
1996 21.8 25.1 46.9 5.95% 363 251 614 7.83%
1997 37.2  4.8 42.0 5.03% 362 188 550 6.60%
1998 38.2 -1.3 36.9 4.18% 636 114 750 8.53%
1999 51.3 -6.3 45.0 4.84% 442 130 572 6.12%
2000 60.8 -33.3 27.5 2.82% 597 18 615 6.18%
2001 74.2 3.2 77.4 7.58% 623 133 756 7.10%
2002 107.3 31.7 139.0 13.00% 783 421 1204 11.31%
2003 126.6 35.5 162.1 14.26% 1064 555 1619 14.53%
2004 133.4 40.6 174.0 14.50% 1468 596 2064 17.41%
2005 73.1 39.6 112.7 8.92% 1151 553 1704 13.50%
2006 157.3 36.1 193.4 14.50% 1207 574 1781 13.31%
2007 107.7 29.9 137.6 9.74% 851 501 1352 9.64%
2008 29.5 96.3 125.8 8.73% -151 1071 920 6.03%
2009 -17.4 204.7 187.3 13.35% -222 1885 1663 11.93%
2010 8.0 172.8 180.8 12.33% -179 1652 1473 10.14%
2011 0.6 102.1 101.5 6.76% -210 1229 1019 6.75%
2012 32 1276 1308 8.24%
   
Quite a few conclusions can be drawn from table 3.
The  first  conclusion  is  that  it  is  useful  to  add  up  government  incremental  borrowings  and  individual  
households’ incremental borrowings, for the simple reason that individual households are the sole group 
responsible  for  paying  back both type  of  debts.  Individual  households’ capacity to  pay back such debt 
depends on their income and equity base. Incomes depend on job levels, the labour force participation rates 
and income’ increases above or below inflation levels. They collectively determine whether the individual 
households  have  any  chance  of  paying  such  debt  back.  Equity  levels  depend  on  income,  asset  price 
developments  and  liabilities  incurred.  When  some  households  do  not  fulfil  their  borrowing obligations 
-either as individuals, companies, banks or even governments-, such losses will find their way into home 
prices,  share  prices,  dividend  flows  and  increased  taxation  levels.  They affect  the  net  worth  levels  of  
individual households. Surpluses or deficits on the current account of the balance of payments determine  
whether a country has to borrow from abroad or can lend overseas
The  second  conclusion  is  that  increased  borrowing  levels  by  individual  households  plus  governments  
together  are  only  sustainable  in  an  economy if  they  do  not  force  asset  prices  to  go  up.  Studying  the 
experiences of the U.S. and the U.K. leads to the conclusion that an annual 5%-6% increase in borrowing  
levels by individual households plus governments as compared to the nominal GDP level, seems to be the 
norm for avoiding asset price inflation. Such levels of borrowings avoid the boom and bust scenarios. In this 
context inflation should be defined as inflation in consumer good prices plus asset price changes. Any level 
above the 6% seems to lead to asset price inflation. This implies that governments need to manage their own  
borrowing behaviour in conjunction with that of individual households.
10
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The third conclusion is that the year 2004 was the most excessive year of increased borrowings. In the U.S 
not  only  did  individual  households  borrow  nearly  2.5  times  as  much  as  they  did  in  2000,  the  U.S. 
Government also increased its borrowings by over 33 times its 2000 level. 17.41% of GDP was created with  
borrowed funds. The Federal Open Market Committee did raise interest rates a number of times in 2004, but 
two  factors  made  such  increases  ineffective.  The  first  one  was  based  on  expectations.  If  individual  
households expect house price increases to exceed the costs of borrowings, they will not be stopped by small  
adjustments in interest rates. For instance over the fourth quarter 2003 U.S house prices increased at 14.67% 
on an  annualised  basis.  In  2004 over  the  whole  year  they increased  by 11.17% 5.  Compare  this  to  the 
available 5.9% fixed rate for a 30 year mortgage in 2004 and the choice made by many individuals was for  
more borrowing, helped by banks that were more than eager to comply. Secondly not a single government in  
the world seems to be guided in their borrowing behaviour by what the prevailing interest rates are. After all  
a government does not itself pay back the debt it has created. When interest rates are not effective, other  
measures,  like increased reserve ratios on loans,  should have been applied to stop the rapid increase in  
(home) loans. Such measures should also have been applied to investment banks, which sold mortgage bonds  
to the public.
For the U.K, just like in the U.S., the year 2004 showed that borrowings by individual households increased 
at a rate of 2.2 times the pace of the year 2000. On top of this the U.K. government borrowed additionally 
£40.6 billion while in the year 2000 the same Labour Government had reduced its borrowings by £33.3 
billion, a swing of £73.9 billion.
The fourth conclusion is that from 2008 individual households in the U.K. and the U.S. basically stopped 
borrowing additional sums. Not only that, they started paying off debt as can be seen from the U.S figures. 
Individual  households  both in  the  U.K.  and U.S.  did fund all  new home buildings -at  a reduced home 
building start rate- from incomes rather than from borrowings. All this shows that individual households act  
much more in line with expectations, rather than react to interest rate changes.
The fifth conclusion is that the U.S. and U.K. governments (had) to increase their borrowing amounts since 
2008.  However,  with a reduced equity base and reduced incomes,  individual  households can not  easily 
absorb the increased tax levels that are needed to get government finances back in balance. In a recent study 
of 17 countries made by Messrs Luca, Castro and Sousa about adjustments to government deficits,  they 
concluded that it would be better to make sharp cuts in government expenditure rather than increasing tax 
levels; the earlier method would affect income levels of individual households the least.6
5 Some possible remedial actions
5.1 Considerations
Pension funds
A structural change has taken place both in the U.S. and in the U.K. This change has been the accumulation  
of financial resources in pension reserves. Pension reserves are assets owned by individual households and 
invested in financial assets. In line with the objective to build up a pension pot sufficient to cover the income 
needs over the retirement period, the build up sum of financial assets is only very gradually released back to  
incomes. This all means is that individual households have substantial financial savings, but are unable to  
access any of such savings, even at times when an income gap occurs.
How important these savings are can be illustrated by the most recent figures in the U.S. At the end of the  
fourth quarter 2012 pension reserves stood at $14.06 trillion, while all liabilities by individual households, 
excluding government debt, stood at $13.45 trillion per same date. Individual households in the U.S. have  
5 http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1189/4q03hpi.pdf
6 http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2012/NIPE_WP_18_2012.pdf
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been saving very substantially over the period 2008-2012. As per the end of 2008 these figures were: pension 
reserves: $10.51 trillion and collective household liabilities $14.11 trillion. 
For the U.K. the figures are equally striking. At the end of 2011 the insurance technical reserves stood at  
£2.21  trillion,  of  which  pension  reserves  at  over  £2  trillion,  and  total  household  liabilities  -excluding  
government debt- at £1.54 trillion. Per end 2008 the comparable figures were insurance technical reserves: 
£1.90 trillion and financial liabilities: £1.55 trillion.
The assets of nearly all pension funds are practically completely invested in marketable financial assets.  
Pension funds allocate their financial resources over a portfolio of shares, bonds, mortgage backed securities  
or other securities. Such investments represent the liabilities of banks, companies, government entities and, 
to a very limited extent, individual households. Such investments help economic growth, but only in periods 
that individual households do not experience the income gap phenomenon. Collectively pension funds are 
pro cyclical institutions, in good times they raise the pay-out to pensioners, in bad times they reduce the pay-
out. Individual savings in pension funds are not used to help close the income gap; in effect they help to 
widen the gap when such a gap occurs. 
Banks
Banks are different from companies. If companies sell their products, they know what price they will receive  
for their produced good or service. They know their costs of production, so they can assess their profit levels  
quite  quickly.  Banks  sell  risk  products.  They sell  longer  term loans  based  on  assumptions  on  income 
developments of their clients and on asset values. Whether the clients of a bank: individuals, companies,  
other banks and even governments, will pay them back is an uncertain event. However in order to stay in 
business, banks have to pay their depositors -their costs of funds, their working capital costs-. In the U.S.  
70% of all liabilities of individual households are constituted by home mortgages and a further 20.7% by 
consumer credits.  The 2008 crisis was caused by excessive lending to individual households in previous 
years, who could not afford to pay back the home mortgage loans. Such loans were sold to investors who,  
when loans turned into bad debts- had no link to the bank clients and only wanted to get out of such bonds as 
soon as possible. Long term loans had been turned into daily tradable obligations, which stopped being 
tradable, when buyers for such obligations disappeared. Bank losses, both for commercial banks, specialised 
mortgage banks and for investment banks became so extensive that a number of them were rescued.
Other financial institutions
The Balance Sheet  of  Households  in  the  U.S.  shows that  per  end of  2012 the total  financial  assets  of  
individual  households  added  up  to  $54.4  trillion  and  the  nonfinancial  assets  (homes,  equipment  and 
consumer durable goods) stood at $25.1 trillion. Of course with this distribution of wealth, clever financiers 
try to make money out of money by gambling on the outcome of all types of future developments: interest 
rates, currency rates, commodity prices, credit risks to name but a few. The derivative business was created.  
The drive for derivatives was not just created for speculation purposes. Banks, companies and pension funds  
and sometimes individuals have a genuine wish to transfer specified risks on future cash flows in order to  
ensure that the outcome can be fixed. However from a macro-economic point of view the speculation aspect 
is not particularly productive; economies will  become more productive if the underlying reasons for the 
volatility of prices would be managed better. 
In the U.K. the non-financial assets of individual households came to £4.30 trillion per end of 2011 and the  
financial assets came to £4.28 trillion per same date.
Companies
When companies  create  a  production  capacity,  as  they did  in  the  run  up  to  2008,  they do  this  in  the  
expectation of using such capacity nearly to the full extent. When a major drop in sales occurs as it did in  
2008 and subsequent years, companies scramble to reduce their capacity. Employees are laid off and less 
machinery and equipment is ordered. Multinationals and major companies started hoarding cash rather than  
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invest or employ more people. They also kept and keep tight checks on salaries, so as to restore their own 
profitability levels.
Central Banks
When discussing the experiences of the last 18 years, the term Central Bank is used to include all authorities  
which supervise and set rules for the banking  and financial sector, so as to avoid the opportunity for some  
entity to hide behind others in claiming it was some one else’s responsibility.
Central banks in the U.S. and the U.K., just like in many other countries, did fail in controlling the volume of  
lending going into the housing markets. This led to asset price inflation far higher than the RPI or CPI level.  
As stated above, in the fourth quarter of 2003 house prices in the U.S. increased by 14.67% on an annualised 
basis and for the whole year  2004 by 11.7%. 30 year  fixed interest  rates at  5.9% were no deterrent  to 
borrowing. This showed up in table 3 in that 17.41% of the U.S GDP and 14.50% in the U.K. GDP in 2004 
was financed, not by incomes, but by borrowings. The seeds of the 2008 crisis were sown.
Central banks did not insist that banks guarantee the home mortgage obligations sold to outside investors.  
Had central banks done so, most commercial banks would not have entered into such large volumes of home 
mortgage lending and investors would have had the benefit of bank guarantees rather than the collateral base 
of homes. In the U.S. alone 5.5 million “second hand homes” were brought back into the market since 2008,  
distorting home prices for all home owners, not just the doubtful debtors. Also investment banks would have 
made substantially lower profits on mortgage bonds as only bank guaranteed risks would have been sold.
It is somewhat short sighted to state that the only Central Bank inflation objective deals with consumer goods 
and  not  with  individual  households’  asset  values.  Incomes  and  asset  values  are  intricately  linked  for 
individual households as the 2008 crisis has shown.
Central banks have no control over the borrowing behaviour of a government. As table 3 shows, the creation 
of  debt  by  a  government  should  be  added  up  to  that  of  individual  households  as  the  latter  group  is 
responsible for paying back both types of debt. Non- inflationary debt creation levels for P + G would seem  
to hover around 6-7% of nominal GDP. 
Interest rates do not seem to have any impact  on government borrowing levels.  They also seem -as the 
evidence shows- to have little impact on individual households when house prices increase at a rate far above  
the costs of borrowing. Interest rates do have an impact on company borrowings, as they constitute one  
element  in  profit  assessments.  Lowering  of  interest  rates  has  little  impact  on  individual  households’ 
borrowings when an income gap has  occurred.  Rather than borrowing more  as  when house prices rise,  
individual households will save more when house prices drop, notwithstanding low interest rates. This has  
been the case for both the U.S. and the U.K.
Central banks have used the recession period to buy up government debt -quantitative easing-. In creating  
money to do so, central banks have achieved two unwanted targets: (1) the price of fixed rate government  
bonds or gilts has been artificially altered, to create an accounting gain for holders of such bonds, like banks  
and pension funds. However such gains will turn into losses when interest rates over such bonds start to rise.
(2) Individual households, who are main government bondholders -mostly indirectly through pension funds 
and mutual funds- , have seen a drop in income levels over such bonds. This was realised at a time that  
additional  incomes  would  be  most  welcome  to  close  the  income  gap  for  individual  households.  If  
governments had mainly issued index-linked bonds, such gains and losses would have been substantially 
smaller and fixed rate loans to companies would not have been affected. However individual households  
would have benefitted from such a move.
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Financial assets and liabilities and economic growth
More money in circulation does not mean a higher economic growth rate or higher profits for companies or  
more jobs and incomes exceeding inflation levels. If economics were so simple, just print money and give it  
away.  However  such action would totally undermine  the value of  money.  Individual  households  would 
return to a barter economy. In the above it was made clear that money flows transferred from one group of 
savers  to  another  group of  users  can  induce  asset  price  inflation  and  consumer  goods  inflation.  If  the  
collective of individual households incur losses due to some groups -individual doubtful debtors, companies 
going into receivership, banks going bankrupt or severely restricting lending levels, governments not paying 
back their debts- such losses reduce the values of the accumulated savings -the equity net worth of individual  
households-. Such net worth losses can and does sometimes change the attitudes to savings by individual  
households. A major loss in net worth occurred both in the U.S. and in the U.K. in 2008. It affected banks in  
many countries  and led to  a  major  loss  in  confidence.  Individuals  lost  their  jobs  and incomes  and the 
downward cycle was set in. Increased borrowings by individual households in previous periods were turned 
into actions to reduce debt levels. Lower house prices were not accompanied by increased sales of homes but 
rather the reverse, especially in the U.S., where the overhang of repossessed homes had to be digested before 
new homes could be sold again.
All these factors led to individual households’ incomes and net worth -the changes in assets and liabilities- to  
show an income gap: individual households were collectively unable to increase their consumption patterns, 
due to the losses made. In the next section some possible solutions are suggested.
5.2 Remedial Actions
 
The formulation of remedial actions needs to start with the analysis of the causes and effects of an income  
gap occurring:
• The start of creating an income gap for individual households begins with accelerated lending levels  
to  both individual  households  and to  governments  (the  year  2004 in  table  3).  Such increase in 
liabilities for all individual households was not followed by more production at stable prices, but by 
an asset price inflation level, far above the consumer price increases (again 2004 as the example). A 
high rate of asset price inflation makes the use of interest rate adjustments ineffective as expectations 
over  interest  rate  costs  and asset  price  inflation deviate.  For  a  substantial  number  of  individual  
households increased liabilities did not keep pace with increases in incomes. The “doubtful debtor 
loss rate” went up; the effect of it was postponed for some time as many mortgages were granted 
with a low start up interest rate for a few years. Increased losses followed the steep interest rate  
hikes. Through the sales of such mortgages to third parties, banks forced the doubtful debtor issue  
into the open. From the moment investors realised that they would not be paid back for a substantial 
part of their investments, investors wanted the assets to be sold off. Losses were realised and the net  
equity level of individual households both in the U.S and the U.K. was severely affected. Home  
prices  dropped  in  a  major  way,  leading  to  more  equity  losses  to  individual  households.  This  
deterioration in their net equity level led individual households to stop increasing their borrowing 
levels and start  saving more (2008 till  currently).  Companies reacted to lower demand levels by 
dismissing staff. They also kept staff remuneration increases below their price increases (2009 till 
currently). Furthermore companies reduced their investments in capital goods and bigger companies 
started hoarding cash. The income gap for individual households was created. Last but not least  
governments experienced substantial deficits in their own budgets as tax revenues dropped.
The remedial actions can be clustered around four items:
• An income injection scheme: economic easing
• A different set of interest rates used for individual households as compared to those being used for  
companies
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• Setting up a National Mortgage Bank and National Mortgage Insurance Company, and
• A different approach to bank capital rules
5.3 An income injection scheme: economic easing
The absolute income gap situation reflects the period over which individual households are unable to find a 
sufficient  number  of  jobs;  see  the  labour  force  participation  rate  drop  for  reasons  other  than  normal 
retirement patterns; see their earnings increase with less than inflation levels and see governments trying to 
bring order to their own budgets by increasing tax rates. When all this happened -as the evidence shows-  
individual households in the U.K. and the U.S. continued to transfer incomes into financial and real assets  
through two channels. They firstly stopped borrowing and started repaying outstanding loans, while they 
simultaneously funded new homes’ building not through additional borrowings but by using incomes and 
savings. In this manner individual households are hoping to restore their equity base in their most important 
real asset: their homes. Secondly, again both in the U.K. and the U.S., individual households continued to  
pump more  money into their  pension  savings;  again  this  represented  a  net  cash  flow from incomes  to 
financial assets.
Paying  off  debts  is  a  sound  policy  for  individual  households  after  a  period  over  overindulgence  in 
borrowings. However such policy does little to restore economic growth and/or increase employment levels  
as jobs and incomes are kept under pressure due to the lack of disposable incomes. Such adjustments can 
take many years. As stated before when the labour force is not used to its full capacity, it reflects a loss  
which cannot be regained in future years.
In the above, reference was made to the importance of pension funds both in the U.K. and in the U.S.  
Currently in each of these two countries, these funds together have financial assets outstripping all financial  
liabilities of individual households. However the net pension funds contribution to the incomes of individual 
households is very restricted. This is due to the composition of the pension savers and retirees per pension  
fund, whereby the savers get no income in the year that the savings are made and the retirees get only a small 
percentage of their  total  pension pot.  Furthermore the authorities are strongly involved in  ensuring that  
pension funds keep sufficient reserves. This involvement causes individual pension funds to pay out less to 
pensioners in bad economic times and increase the pay-outs in good times. The existence of pension funds  
and their current size enhances the continuation of the income gap phenomenon.
My proposal -as expressed in several previous papers- is to help pension funds understand that it is in their 
own self-interest to help close the income gap. It is also in the interest of their savers by creating a better  
business environment for companies and banks, which will lead to higher share prices, lower government 
deficit levels and most importantly getting people back into work.
Individual households cannot change the rules of savings in pension funds, only governments can. Even 
individual pension funds cannot act on their own, only collective action will get the desired result.
Economic easing is based on the thought that the level of equity owned by individual households is of little 
use, if from time to time -at times of an income gap occurring- equity cannot be turned into incomes.
Take the case of the U.S. If, for instance, the US authorities would accept that the U.S. pension funds pay out 
about 2% of their equity base: U.S$ 280 billion over four quarterly instalments, and request the U.S pension 
savers and retirees to spend such money on consumer goods, demand for goods and services would increase  
substantially. Such action will create jobs and start the process of recovery.
As economic easing is of national importance, the U.S. government could provide a shortfall guarantee to  
pension funds if, in say 3 years, pension funds have not recovered the amounts spend (the $280 billion plus 
interest) through increases in their financial assets portfolios. The U.S. government, companies and banks 
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will all profit from the extra cash injection, which is nothing more than a temporary switch from equity into  
cash, both owned by individual households. Individual households do not incur extra debt; they use their  
own financial resources. The only risk individual households incur is that the shortfall guarantee is called 
upon. Even this risk is mitigated in that higher levels of economic activity will nearly automatically lead to  
lower government deficits.
To help make the pay-out most effective it is helpful that all pension savers and pensioners receive an equal  
amount; this will benefit the younger savers more, but they have to contribute the most in future years and 
run the highest level of investment risks. It would also be helpful if the pay-out is tax free as the aim is to 
supplement individual households’ incomes. Such “temporary pension dividend” can be stopped at any time 
that a nearly full employment situation is reached.
Pension funds -and society- will benefit tremendously from economic easing. Those individuals, who are not 
yet saving for a funded pension, will have a strong incentive to start doing so. At any time the income gap  
reappears, such pension dividend policy could be used.
5.4 Interest rate setting and government debt
There is no law which states that savers need to receive the same interest level as borrowers. There is also no  
law which says that different groups of borrowers -individual households and companies- could not have 
different borrowing rates suited to them.
What individual households and their long term savings institutions need (pension funds in particular) is the 
availability of index-linked government bonds, which pay a positive spread over inflation. Income flows 
over inflation levels is highly desirable for savers. What individual households need, in their capacity as  
borrowers for the acquisition of homes, is the availability of 30 years fixed rate mortgages. In section 5.5 a  
proposal for a national mortgage bank will be set out. What companies need is the availability of short term 
working capital loans and somewhat longer term loans on a fixed rate basis.
Government debt has to be repaid by individual households, even if a central bank buys up such debt titles 
through quantitative easing. Therefore there should be no obstacle in granting the wish of savers to have, say  
80% of public debt financed with index linked bonds. They can be of long maturities -ten years or longer-.  
Such bonds eliminate the inflation risk out of the equation, making holding on to such bonds much more  
attractive. Governments with large accumulated debt levels -which cannot be repaid in any other way than 
over many years- need long term funding for their debts for which index-linked bonds are ideally suited.
For individual households acting as borrowers for buying a home, a long term fixed rate loan is advisable as  
income developments are uncertain. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac fulfil this role already in the U.S. Again in  
the next section some further thoughts will be developed.
For the funding of companies,  banks do generally cater  well.  However if  an economic  easing policy is  
followed,  banks  will  have  an  easier  task  in  predicting  future  cash  flows  for  large  and  smaller  sized 
companies. On the whole companies are better off with fixed rate loans, but their maturities do rarely exceed  
ten years.
In conclusion different groups need different interest rates for the varied reasons of saving and borrowing.
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5.5 A National Mortgage Bank and National Mortgage Insurance Company
The  key  consideration  is  to  organize  stability  and  predictability  for  mortgage  payments  as  income 
developments are already quite unpredictable for individual households. Long term fixed rate mortgages are 
therefore desirable. Banks do not have 30 year fixed rate funds to lend. They also cannot reasonably be 
expected to take on maturity mismatches, by funding short and lending long. Most banks prefer to lend on a  
variable interest rate basis, which of course does not guarantee stability and predictability. However the latter 
elements are just the elements of risk management which individual households need.
In the United States 30 year mortgages are the standard rather than the exception. Of all new mortgages  
granted in 2012, 95% of these mortgages have an involvement of either Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac. Their  
January 2013 interest offer on a 30 year fixed rate mortgage was 3.41% per annum. This percentage includes 
both the funding costs plus the risk premium for good clients.
The proposal for the U.K. is to set up a State sponsored enterprise (NMB) along somewhat similar lines as  
Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac.
Its aim is to help individual households, especially the low and medium income households, to buy their own 
homes or move from smaller to larger accommodations when households’ needs change. Its aim is also to 
protect individual households -and as a consequence the economy- against interest rate rises, which were not  
foreseen at the time of taking out the mortgage.
-Shared Risks between NMB and the banks and building societies
In the case of the U.S. both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac not only take up the funding risks for clients, they  
also take the client default risks. In the proposed set up for the U.K these risks are split up between the NMB 
taking the funding risks and the commercial banking sector taking the client credit risks.
NMB would be providing the long term funds for a home acquisition to an individual household in an  
indirect manner, via the commercial banks and building societies. These latter organisations will add their  
risk premium to the interest rate set by the NMB according to the payment risk that different households  
represent. The commercial banks/building societies will also set up a time table with their client to see how 
the long term loan will be repaid. The banks and building societies will provide a guarantee to the NMB for  
the servicing of the mortgage loans taken out by their customers through NMB funding. Banks and building 
societies would also do well to require their mortgage customers to have their salary account with the lending 
bank/society, so that they can follow income developments of their client. If a client wishes to move the  
mortgage to a different bank, the salary account should preferably move with it. Credit monitoring should 
remain the role of the banks/societies.
The technicalities of the funding process for the NMB could be similar to the way both Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac raise funds out of the money and capital markets. Of course banks and building societies as well  
as pension funds and individual investors could participate in these fund raising exercises.
Both Fannie  Mae and Freddy Mac have private shareholders.  In  my view NMB should be a  collective 
enterprise  and therefore  the  ownership should be all  individual  households  together,  represented by the  
Government. An initial equity capital injection could come from the Government or the Bank of England. In 
case the NMB turns in a profit, this should not be distributed but added to the reserves of the Mortgage Bank.  
Its liabilities would not constitute government debt as the loans would not have been used for government  
expenditure.
The creation of a National Mortgage Bank brings mortgage lending to one main point in a society. This has 
the  great  advantage  that  competition  between lenders  is  about  credit  risks  and not  about  taking  undue 
funding risks. If individual households want to expand their home mortgage levels too quickly as was the 
case in 2004 and later  years,  the best  financial  organisational  structure  to  deal  with such demands  is  a  
centralised lending organisation.  This centralised financial  company,  the NMB -owned by all  individual  
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households together- can speed up or just as in the case of the 2004 situation slow down the process of 
granting home mortgages.
-The National Mortgage Insurance Company
Adverse life events will have an effect on the payment performance of some customers. The aim of the NMI  
is to cover these effects to the extent that they are not self inflicted. Such protection is especially essential for  
the lower and median income classes. Nearly all of them have to rely fully on their own employment income  
and do not posses large sums of available cash other than the amounts accumulated in their pension pots. 
The NMI can also help first time buyers by insuring the first 10 or 15% of the mortgage loan after say a 5% 
or 10% down payment was made. The remainder 80% of the credit risk would remain the risk of the lending  
bank. Once individual households have reached the 20% equity, the policy would stop to be effective.  The  
NMI can act as a catalyst  as well as a brake in the number of home mortgages granted, by temporarily  
changing the risks it underwrites when mortgage levels grow too slowly or too fast.
The equity pattern for the NMI can follow the pattern of the NMB.
5.6 A Revised Bank Risk Management Structure
When  bank  regulators  consider  changing  the  operating  rules  for  banks,  they  focus  strongly  but  not  
exclusively on bank solvency.  Solvency reflects the assets and liabilities of a bank, its balance sheet.  In  
section 5.1 it was already stated that banks are different from companies. This is most clearly shown in the 
flexibility companies have when sales are below or are expected to be below the planned level. They can cut  
expenses on staff, raw materials and intermediate goods and sometimes reduce borrowings and or even save  
some cash.
Lending banks’ main  expense is  the  interest  expense,  as they are highly geared operations.  Their  main  
income is  interest  income  over  loans.  This  interest  income  is  influenced by doubtful  debtors’  not  fully 
returning interest and principal. This is similar to a company selling an item at a price, but only receiving  
part of the price.  For banks such reduced cash flow might  happen years after the loan was made.  The  
conclusion is that banks are income -cash flow- based companies rather asset based ones. They do not know 
from the outset what “price” they will receive over the risks taken.
At a British Bankers’ Conference held in October last year the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England was 
quoted as stating that “doubtful debtor accounting are holding banks back”7.
My proposal is in line with this thinking. The proposal is:
-Change bank risk accounting standards
Allow banks to make provisions for doubtful debtors from the moment they enter into loan contracts, be it a  
mortgage, a consumer loan, a corporate loan, or corporate or government bond. Banks know or should know, 
from experience, what the payment performance is among their chosen client base. They should anticipate  
the risks; which means the potential provisions to be made. Allow banks to foresee the write-offs and the 
period over which such provisions should be made, which in any case should be shorter than the lending 
period. Once a bank has decided on the potential write-offs, they should be fixed in the accounting ledger.  
Only the amounts  entered at  the  time  of  entering into the  loan agreement  or  bond purchase should be 
recognised for tax deductibility. If actual write offs would turn out to be more, such extra loss should come 
7 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2012/oct/17/accounting-rules-banking-valuations
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out of shareholders funds and not from the taxpayers. If actual write offs turn out to be less than anticipated,  
this constitutes a bank profit and corporate tax rates would be levied.
Banks do not need equity capital related to categories of risks that banking supervisors decide for them. 
Leave it to the bank involved; leave it to the managements whose job it is to assess risks. They should know 
their clients. However banks need buffer funds and such buffer funds could be in the form of perpetual notes 
rather than equity share capital.  The difference is that the perpetual  note holder gets a fixed amount of  
interest per annum. (Barclays Bank of the U.K. has just announced the issuance of such risk notes). If banks 
pay interest over such notes, it means that all classes of money depositors get paid for providing the banks 
with different classes of risk money. In case banks have not set aside enough risk provision money out of 
their income, the losses are reflected in a value write down of the perpetual notes, which are listed on the  
stock markets. If banks have over provided, such income after tax may occasionally be distributed over the 
perpetual notes holders.
In this set up all money providers to banks are regularly paid for their risks in the banking business. Sound  
risk judgments lead to adequate up-front provisions and the profits made are not distorted by insufficient  
provisioning.  Conservative and well  managed banks will  gain at  the expense of aggressive risk seeking 
banks. Too low a provisioning level will punish perpetual note holders.  Bankers’ bonuses should be paid out 
on a deferral basis and after perpetual note holders have been paid. Bonuses should be paid in perpetual  
notes. Good bank managers should be rewarded and poor managements will have to forego their bonuses 
before perpetual note holders are affected. In any case the markets can follow which banks are the healthy  
ones. Under current accounting rules, they have not got a clue.
In the  categories  of  risk taking,  all  types  of investment  banking activities  should also be included.  For 
instance own account trading requires at least a fifty percent provisioning; some derivatives trading also  
require a higher percentage than individual household loans or corporate loans. Mergers and acquisitions  
activities  require  a  better  level  of  provisioning;  so  do  stock  market  introductions.  Again  the  more  
conservative banks will win it from the aggressive banks as too low provisioning is punished by not being 
tax deductible. In the latter case, this means that more perpetual notes will be needed to keep up the banking  
buffer. The markets will know which bank has acted most prudently with customers’ monies.
In the manner set out above, conservative banks will put their clients’ interest first and bankers’ rewards 
second. Aggressive banks will need to convince the markets that they need increasing amounts of perpetual 
notes  in  order  to  survive.  The  rewards  and brakes  are  built  in  into  the  revised  bank risk  management  
structure.
A major discussion among bank regulators and governments is going on about how to avoid government  
bail-outs.  Up-front  tax-deductible  risk  provisioning;  paying  all  fund  providers  for  their  funds  with  the 
difference of risk taking reflected in the interest rates paid and perpetual notes acting as the buffer for errors  
made  by  the  bankers.  Independent  accountants  appointed  by  a  Central  Bank  to  check  on  the  risk  
provisioning.
However the key to stable banking activities is to create the economic environment which reduces the risks  
for individual households, companies, banks and governments together: what economies need in my view is 
a policy to deal with the absolute income gap.
6 Conclusions
The concept of an absolute income gap is a useful tool to help analyse what went on in the two countries that  
were subject of this study: the United States and the United Kingdom. Such an income gap can be defined as  
a shortfall in incomes and equity for all individual households in a country to purchase all goods and services 
in their economy. Unemployment, underemployment, lower labour force participation rates, wage increases 
below inflation levels are all symptoms of an absolute income gap appearing. Accelerating borrowing levels 
by both individual households and governments can create asset price inflation and can cause higher levels  
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of doubtful  debtors throughout the economy.  This can happen for individual  households,  for  companies  
through higher insolvency levels, through bank failures and reduced lending opportunities and even through 
governments  through higher  budget  deficits.  All  these  “losses”  lead  to  negative  equity adjustments  for 
individual households.
If individual households are not helped -through helping themselves- in readjusting their income levels, than 
the process of adjustment takes quite a few years. After the 2008 individual households’ equity crisis, they 
reacted  by  saving  more  and  borrowing  less  in  order  to  restore  their  equity  base.  However  at  higher 
unemployment rates and wages growth below inflation levels, such readjustments take a long time, while in  
the meantime their collective obligations to service rapidly increasing government debt levels presses the 
readjustments to extend even further in time.
Pension funds represent equity for individual households - financial markets assets- but very little in terms of 
incomes. Economic easing was suggested as a means to overcome this equity-income gap. 
Individual households and the economy as a whole are well served, if a centralised funding organisation 
would be created: a National Mortgage Bank and a National Mortgage Insurance company. The Bank would 
provide commercial banks with mortgage loans for which these banks underwrite the credit risks on their  
clients and the NMB takes the funding risks. The NMI could, among others, from time to time help first time 
buyers to get onto the property ladder. The NMB and NMI together would be well placed to manage the  
volume of new mortgage loans, so as to avoid asset inflation levels far above consumer price increases.
There is a need and justification for separate interest rates according to the supplier of funds or the user.  
Governments are in a position to make this happen. Individual household’ savers deserve protection from 
inflation levels when it comes to government debt; the tool is index-linked government bonds. Individual 
households have to repay any government debt; therefore the income granted to the savers is an income  
enhancing  measure  -especially  useful  when  an  absolute  income  gap  occurs-  while  the  debt  repayment  
obligation has to come out of future incomes. Bringing incomes forward helps to cut short the period of the  
income gap occurring.
Individual households’ borrowing for the purchase of a home requires very long term fixed rate mortgages.  
Commercial  banks  cannot  attract  such  funds  and  they  thereby  transfer  such  risks  to  the  individual  
households, which at times of interest rate volatility can lead to an income gap occurring. In the above the  
cases for establishing the NMB and NMI have been discussed.
Companies are usually well served by banks, but stability in an economy is not something individual banks 
can organise. Short and medium term loans at fixed rates are what most companies need.
Finally banks are different from companies in that they depend on uncertain incoming cash-flows from their  
clients.  Different accounting rules are needed as well as a transition to perpetual notes with a fixed reward  
rather than rules on bank equity levels. Good conservative banks should be rewarded, while over aggressive 
banks be stopped by the drop in the values of the perpetual notes.
The main focus in this paper has been on individual households as in my view these households provide the  
key to economic prosperity or failure. Indirectly the government,  companies and banks will  all  thrive if  
individual households thrive. What is the world waiting for?
Drs Kees De Koning
Chorleywood WD3 5NX
United Kingdom
8th April 2013
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